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ABSTRACT: In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of particu-
lar facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of laws, more specifically about micro-
explanations of laws in physics. We investigate whether providing unificatory information has a surplus 
value in micro-explanations of physical laws. Unificatory information is information that provides ontolog-
ical unification in the sense defined by Uskali Mäki. We argue that providing unificatory information may 
lead to explanations with more explanatory power (we use Jim Woodward’s concept of explanatory power 
for that) and that it may lead to more strongly supported explanations. 
Keywords: causal mechanisms; explanation of laws; explanatory virtues; unification. 
RESUMEN: En la literatura sobre explicación científica hay una distinción clásica entre explicaciones de hechos parti-
culares y explicaciones de leyes. El presente artículo trata de las explicaciones de las leyes, más en concreto, 
de las microexplicaciones de las leyes en la física. Analizamos si proporcionar información unificadora po-
see un valor adicional en las microexplicaciones de las leyes físicas. La información unificadora es informa-
ción que proporciona unificación ontológica en el sentido definido por Uskali Mäki. Argumentamos que 
proporcionar información unificadora puede llevar a explicaciones con mayor poder explicativo (aquí em-
pleamos el concepto de poder explicativo de Jim Woodward), y también a explicaciones más firmemente 
apoyadas. 
Palabras clave: mecanismos causales; explicación de las leyes; virtudes explicativas; unificación. 
1. Introduction 
In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between ex-
planations of particular facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explana-
tions of laws, more specifically micro-explanations of physical laws. In this introduc-
tion we first clarify two key terms: physical law and micro-explanation. Then we clarify 
why and how we will investigate the role of unification in micro-explanations of phys-
ical laws (i.e., we clarify our aims and our method). 
1.1 
In order to get an idea of the subject-matter involved here, let us look at some exam-
ples and important groups of physical laws (the groups are certainly not exhaustive). 
First, there are quantitative laws, typically expressed by means of a mathematical for-
mula. An example is the Ideal Gas Law (IGL): 
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For equal quantities of gas in a container, the product of the pressure P and the 
volume V is proportional to the temperature T, with a proportionality constant 
R (the ideal gas constant). 
Second we have qualitative regularities describing sufficient condition relations be-
tween properties: 
In mercury thermometers, the mercury level first drops and then rises when 
they are rapidly immersed in hot water. 
Third, there are regularities in which capacities are ascribed to classes of objects, for 
instance: 
Copper has the capacity to conduct electricity. 
As an overall view on what scientific laws are, we adopt Sandy Mitchell’s pragmatic 
approach (1997, 2000, 2003). The core idea of this approach is that a continuum of 
contingency/stability replaces the traditional dichotomy between laws and accidental 
generalisations. Some generalisations are more spatio-temporally stable than others, 
because the conditions on which they depend are more stable in space, in time or 
both. For instance, the truth of Galileo’s law depends on the mass of the Earth, which 
is quite stable in time. Biological laws (the laws that Mitchell was primarily interested 
in) have less spatio-temporal stability than Galileo’s law (and other physical laws) but 
are much more stable than the classical philosopher’s examples of accidental generali-
sations (e.g. “All coins in Goodman’s pocket are made of copper”). Other important 
aspects of Mitchell’s view are (a) that laws may have exceptions and (b) that they are 
not necessarily causal. 
1.2 
We use the term micro-explanation to refer to explanations of (physical) laws that invoke 
entities and activities at a lower level. In other words: in micro-explanations there is de-
composition of the system of which the behaviour is explained. Not every explanation of 
a law is a micro-explanation. Take for instance: 
  General law:     All waves reflect. 
  Auxiliary hypothesis:  Sounds are waves. 
  Explanandum:    Sounds reflect. 
In this explanation the explanandum law is subsumed under a more general law by 
means of an auxiliary hypothesis. This explanation does not refer to the (activities of 
the) entities of which sounds are composed, so it is not a micro-explanation.1  
 We distinguish between two types of micro-explanations: mechanistic explanations 
and aggregation explanations. What is a mechanistic explanation of a law? Starting with 
Machamer, Darden and Craver’s seminal paper ‘Thinking about Mechanisms’ (2000) a 
mechanistic tradition has developed in the philosophy of explanation. For laws, mech-
anistic explanations are defined as follows: 
                                                      
1 For a real example, see chapter 33 of volume II of Feynman et al. 2010; in this chapter several laws of 
geometrical optics (reflection, refraction) are derived from Maxwell’s equations. 
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A mechanistic explanation of a law is a description of the underlying mechanism. 
We define mechanisms as follows: 
A mechanism is a collection of entities and activities that are organized such that 
they realize the macro-level behaviour of a system. 
This definition includes the three key terms which mechanists use: entities, activities 
and organisation. A description of a mechanism is usually called a model of the mecha-
nism. The core idea of the mechanists is that, in order to have explanatory value, the 
model has to describe the mechanism in terms of its entities, its activities and the way 
these entities and activities are organized. We look at some characteristic quotes. 
Bechtel & Abrahamsen write: 
A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component 
operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible 
for one or more phenomena. (2005, 423) 
Carl Craver writes: 
[M]echanisms are entities and activities organized such that they exhibit the explanandum phe-
nomenon. (2007, 6; italics removed) 
These quotes show that mechanists have no unique way of defining what a mecha-
nism is. However, there is a common core idea and our definition of a mechanism 
captures this core idea. 
 Before we turn to aggregation explanation, two remarks are useful to situate our 
use of the core idea of the mechanists. 
(1) The first mechanists mainly focused on the biological and cognitive sciences, 
i.e. their aim was to develop a theory about how to explain biological and cog-
nitive capacities. By applying mechanistic ideas to physics, we imply that these 
ideas are useful outside the originally intended domain. The examples we give 
in Section 2 of this paper support this extension.2   
(2) There is an ambiguity in the mechanisms literature. They want to deal with be-
haviour of individual systems, but also with typical behaviour of classes of in-
dividuals (e.g. a species or a class of computing devices). For instance, they are 
not only interested in the structure of the answer to the question “Why does 
this desk calculator have the capacity to perform exact numerical calculations?” 
but also in the form of the answer to “Why do desk calculators have the capac-
ity to perform exact numerical calculations?”. This distinction is not always 
made clearly in the mechanisms literature. We will come back to this issue lat-
er. What is important now is that, given our focus on laws, we will always be 
talking about classes of individuals. 
 We use the term aggregation explanation to refer to explanations which explain the 
behaviour of the macro-systems (as described in the law) by means of the component 
parts, the activities of these parts, organisation and random distribution of behaviour of com-
ponents. This means that, compared to mechanistic explanations, aggregation explana-
                                                      2 Other people have applied mechanistic ideas outside its original domain, e.g., McKay Illari &             
Williamson (2012). 
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tions have an extra ingredient. This fits the definition of organisation which is pro-
posed by Arnon Levy and William Bechtel: 
When we speak of organization, we do not mean simply the having of some internal structure. 
Organization, as we see it, involves an internal division of causal labor whereby different compo-
nents perform different causal roles. A homogenous fluid in a flask has complex internal struc-
ture. But (for the most part) its behavior does not involve differential causal roles of components. 
On this conception, some systems are organized, whereas others are not. More precisely, some 
systems are more organized than others. (2013, 243) 
By rejecting the equation of organisation and internal structure, this characterisation 
creates the possibility of non-mechanistic micro-explanations: while mechanistic ex-
planations use entities, activities and organisation (and nothing else), there can be ex-
planations which use an extra ingredient: “non-organisational” information about the 
internal structure of the system. Aggregation explanations as we conceive them fit into 
this category.3 
 Levy & Bechtel use “internal division of causal labour” as criterion to distinguish 
organisation from other information about internal structure. We have proposed a 
very similar idea in Weber, Van Bouwel and De Vreese (2013, 61-62). 
1.3  
Our aim in this paper is to find out what the surplus value is (if any) of providing unifi-
catory information in micro-explanations of physical laws. Unificatory information is in-
formation that provides ontological unification in the sense of Uskali Mäki: 
Ontological unification is a matter of redescribing apparently independent and diverse phenome-
na as manifestations (outcomes, phases, forms, aspects) of one and the same small number of en-
tities, powers, and processes. (2001, 498) 
This characterisation of unificatory information is rather loose, and we will be more 
specific in subsequent sections. However, ontological unification rules out what Mäki 
calls derivational unification (2001, 493-4), which aims at an optimal trade-off between 
either a low number of premises and a high number of conclusions (Michael Fried-
man) or a low number of derivational patterns and a high number of conclusions 
(Philip Kitcher). 
 In order to make the aim of this paper a legitimate one, we have to make two 
(strongly interconnected) assumptions: 
(1)  In explanatory texts that provide a micro-explanation of a law, it is possible to 
separate the information that is required for explaining the target law from 
additional unificatory information. 
(2)  Scientists, when writing explanatory texts, can opt to be minimalistic (i.e. only 
provide information relevant for explaining the target law) or can choose to 
add unificatory information. 
The examples we give in this paper support these assumptions, but at this moment we 
cannot give any arguments yet. 
                                                      3 McKay Illari & Williamson (2012) equate organisation with internal structure. Since we side with Levy 
& Bechtel, we do not agree with this. 
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 The method we use exploits these assumptions. We look at examples of explana-
tions of laws. For each case, we construct two possible explanations: a minimal one 
(without unificatory information) and an elaborate one (with unificatory information). 
Then we compare the relative merits of these two constructions. 
1.4  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present an example about the 
behaviour of mercury thermometers. In Section 3 we analyse this example along the 
lines explained in 1.3 and go deeper into what “unificatory information” means in this 
context. In Section 4 we present a second example: the ideal gas law. In Section 5 we 
analyse this second example and compare the results of this analysis with that of Sec-
tion 3. Finally, in Section 6 we situate what we have done in the philosophical litera-
ture on unification. 
2. Mercury thermometers 
2.1 
The example we use here is inspired by an example of Carl Hempel (1965, 246). A 
mercury thermometer is rapidly immersed in hot water. We observe a temporary drop 
of the mercury column, followed by a swift rise. This event can be explained (accord-
ing to Hempel’s DN model) by subsuming it under the following law: 
(L)## In all mercury thermometers that are rapidly immersed in hot water, the mer-
cury level first drops and then rises.   
Hempel uses this law as part of the explanans in his example, because he wants to give 
an example of an explanation of a particular fact. In our example, the law is the ex-
planandum. Three general laws are relevant for explaining (L): the law of thermal ex-
pansion of fluids, the law of thermal expansion of solids and the law of heat conduc-
tion. The law of thermal expansion of fluids is: 
(1)! v = vo + voβt  
(v: final volume; vo: initial volume, β: coefficient of expansion of the fluid considered; 
t: rise (+) or fall (-) of the temperature). The law of thermal expansion of solids is: 
(2) l = lo + loαt  
(l: final length; lo: initial length; α: coefficient of linear expansion of the solid consid-
ered). Finally, the law of heat conduction says that the quantity of heat dQ (joules) 
which, in a time period dt, flows between any two plane surfaces normal to the direc-
tion of heat flow, is given by the equation 
(3)! dQ = -K.A(δθ/δn)dt  
(K: thermal conductivity coefficient (joule/°C.sec.m); A: area of the surfaces; δθ/δn: 
temperature gradient). 
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 Mercury thermometers consist of glass tubes which are partly filled with mercury.  
The law of thermal expansion of fluids, when implemented for mercury, gives us the 
equation: 
(4) v = vo + vo×0.00018×tm  
(v: final volume of the mercury; vo: initial volume of the mercury; 0.00018: coefficient 
of expansion of mercury; tm: rise of the temperature of the mercury). On the other 
hand, the tube of the thermometer will expand in accordance with the following equa-
tion, which is an implementation of the law of thermal expansion of solids: 
(5)! r = ro + ro×0.000008×tg 
(r: final radius of the tube; ro: initial radius of the tube; 0.000008: coefficient of linear 
expansion of glass; tg: rise of the temperature of the tube). Glass is a bad thermal con-
ductor: its thermal conductivity is small. As a consequence, in a first phase, only the 
temperature of the tube will rise: tm=0 and thus v=vo. The relation between the level of 
the mercury and its volume is given by the geometrical formula 
(6) h = v/πr2 
(h: height of the mercury column; v: volume of the mercury; r: radius of the tube). 
From this formula and v=vo we derive that 
(7) h = vo/πr2 
The initial mercury level is given by 
(8) ho = vo/πro2. 
Because the temperature of the tube rises (tg>0), r is larger than ro. The two last equa-
tions and r>ro imply that 
(9) h<ho 
In other words: the mercury level drops in a first phase. But as a result of heat con-
duction, the temperature of the mercury will start to rise after a few instants; the mer-
cury expands (law of thermal expansion of fluids). Because the coefficient of expan-
sion of mercury is large, the expansion will be greater than the extension of the tube. 
Consequently, the mercury level will rise. 
3. Analysis of the mercury example 
3.1 
The explanation in Section 2 fits our definition of a mechanistic explanation: it identi-
fies the components (glass tube, mercury) and describes how they behave (equations 
(4) and (5)); and equations (6)-(9) are consequences of the organisation of the parts 
(the most important organisation-fact is that that mercury is inside the glass tube). 
3.2 
Let us now separate the information that is required for explaining the target law from 
the additional unificatory information. Equations (1) and (2) are not really necessary 
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for describing how mercury thermometers work: all we need is (4) and (5), and these 
can be known independently (by means of experiments with mercury and glass). Simi-
larly, equation (3) is not used in the derivation. Instead, we use its instantiation where 
K is substituted for the thermal conductivity coefficient of glass. 
 In order get a better grip on what is going on here, it is useful to distinguish func-
tional laws from parametric laws. The way we distinguish these types of laws and the 
examples are based on Ajdukiewicz (1974, 318-23). Let us first look at an example of a 
functional law: 
For all free falling material objects x near the surface of the earth and for all 
numbers s en t: if s is the distance covered by x and t the time during which x is 
falling, then s = 9.81×t2/2. 
This is Galileo’s law. Formally, we can write this as: 
  (∀x)(∀s)(∀t)[(S(x)=s ∧ T(x)=t) → s = 9.81×t2/2)]. 
The general form of functional laws is: 
For all objects x in domain D and all numbers r1, r2, ...,rn: if M1(x)=r1, M2(x)=r2, 
..., Mn(x)=rn, then F(r1, ..., rn) = 0.  
An example of a parametric law is: 
For all gas samples x with fixed temperature there is a parameter k such that 
for all numbers p en v: if p is the pressure of x and v its volume at the same 
moment of time then, p×v = k. 
Formally, we can write this as: 
(∀x)(∃k)[(∀p)(∀v)[(P(x)=p ∧ V(x)=v) → p×v = k]. 
The general form of parametric laws is: 
For all objects x in domain D there is a parameter k such that for all numbers 
r1, r2, ..., rn: if M1(x)=r1, M2(x)=r2, ..., Mn(x)=rn, then F(k, r1, ..., rn) = 0. 
 The explanation presented in Section 2 consists of (i) a derivation of the law to be 
explained from functional laws about the behaviour of the parts and knowledge about 
their interaction, and (ii) information (contained in parametric laws) about similar be-
haviour of related objects. The parametric and functional laws are logically independ-
ent. The parametric laws are not derivable from the functional ones because the par-
ametric laws are more general (they are about a larger class of objects); the functional 
laws are not derivable from the parametric laws because the functional laws are more 
precise (they contain a specific value for the parameter). As a consequence, there is 
unificatory information which can be easily separated from the rest of the explanation. 
The explanation as a whole consists of a part that tells us how things work in the case 
at hand, and a part that connects this mechanism to potential mechanisms in similar 
cases. If we delete the latter part, we have a minimal explanation. If we add it, we have 
an elaborate explanation. In 3.3 we compare the value of these two possible construc-
tions. 
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3.3 
In our evaluation we use the core idea on explanatory power which Jim Woodward in-
troduced in his book Making Things Happen: “explanation is a matter of exhibiting sys-
tematic patterns of counterfactual dependence” (2003, 191). He discusses a classic ex-
ample (2003, 187): 
  All ravens are black. 
  a is a raven. 
  ––––––––––––––– 
  a is black. 
He claims that this is not a satisfactory explanation because it … 
… doesn’t tell us about the conditions under which raven a would be some other color than 
black. (2003, 193) 
This fits into his general idea: the argument above tells us that we could have expected 
that a is black, given that we knew that it was a raven. But expectability is not enough 
for Woodward: an explanation must also tell how the explanandum would change if 
the initial conditions would be different. In other words, adequate explanations … 
… locate their explananda within a space of alternative possibilities and show us how which of 
these alternatives is realized systematically depends on the conditions cited in the explanans. They 
do this by enabling us to see how, if these initial conditions had been different or had changed in 
various ways various of these alternatives would have been realized instead. (2003, 191) 
 Before we apply this idea to our case, let us give a simple example of a good and a 
bad explanation. According to Woodward’s criterion of explanatory power, the fol-
lowing argument is useless: 
  (L) All pendula with a length of 1 metre have a period of 2.006 seconds.  
  (C) This pendulum has a length of 1 metre. 
  ––––––––––––––– 
  (E) This pendulum has a period of 2.006 seconds. 
However, the following argument does have explanatory power: 
  (L’) For all pendula: P=2π.√L/g. 
  (C) This pendulum has a length of 1 metre. 
  ––––––––––––––– 
  (E) This pendulum has a period of 2.006 seconds. 
The law (L’) provides counterfactual information: because of its presence the second 
argument tells us how the period would be different if the length of the pendulum 
were different. Law L in the first argument does not give that kind of information. In 
the terminology of Woodward & Hitchcock (2003) and Hitchcock & Woodward 
(2003), (L’) is an explanatory generalisation while L is not explanatory: 
Explanatory generalizations allow us to answer what-if-things-had been-different questions: they 
show us what the value of the explanandum variable depends upon. (Hitchcock & Woodward 2003, 
183) 
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 Let us now apply Woodward’s view on explanatory power to the mercury example. 
The minimal explanation gives some counterfactual information: we can calculate 
what would happen if the expansion coefficients of glass and mercury would be high-
er or lower than they actually are. The elaborate explanation gives the same counter-
factual information, but offers something extra: insight in what would happen if the 
thermometer would be made of different materials. What if the tube of mercury ther-
mometers would not be made of glass, but of another transparent material? The equa-
tions (1)–(3) tell us that similar laws would apply, and that what happens if the differ-
ently composed thermometer is immersed in hot water depends on the thermal con-
ductivity and expansion coefficient of the other material. 
 Woodward not only requires that explanations must answer what-if-things-had-
been-different questions. He also thinks that explanations which answer more such 
questions are better than explanations that answer less such questions. This idea is not 
present in his 2003 book, but clearly present in Hitchcock and Woodward (2003). In 
our mercury example, both the minimal and the elaborate explanation satisfy Wood-
ward’s minimal condition. But the elaborate explanation answers more what-if-things-
had-been-different questions and is therefore better, according to Woodward (and 
Hitchcock). 
3.4 
We can take the analysis one step further: why is it interesting to have as many an-
swers to what-if-things-had-been-different questions as possible? One reason is prac-
tical. If the real situation (the real behaviour we are explaining) is not our ideal, the an-
swers inform us about the possibilities of creating an alternative, more desirable situa-
tion. So the unificatory information may have a practical value. Let us clarify this by 
going deeper into what the unificatory information consists of in this case. 
 In his definition of ontological unification (see Section 1.3), Mäki uses the word 
“redescription”. This is not what is going on here. Rather, something is added (the par-
ametric laws) to an already existing description. This addition enables us to see the 
target phenomenon as a manifestation of powers and processes that are also present 
in other phenomena. In order to see how this additional unificatory information may 
have a practical value, it is important to note that the model which explains the law is 
not a complete description of the mechanism that is responsible for the macro-
behaviour of the systems. Specific thermometers have properties (e.g. a length and a 
mass) that are not mentioned in the explanation. The model puts restrictions (in terms 
of types of entities and organisation) on what the system should look like. All systems 
which satisfy the constraints exhibit the behaviour described in the explanandum law. 
The parametric laws enable us to derive what happens in systems that violate the re-
strictions on the entities but conserve the organisation (thermometers with different ma-
terials). So if we are not satisfied with the behaviour of the system, we can use this in-
formation to create one that does behave in the way we want. Without the parametric 
law, we would have no clue about how these modified systems would behave. 
 Another answer one may give to the question “why is it interesting to have as 
many answers to what-if-things-had-been-different questions as possible?” is that this 
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is what understanding is all about. In other words, we could say that systematic 
knowledge of counterfactual patterns of dependence is intrinsically valuable because it 
provides understanding of the world. Such claim is not uncontroversial. Hempel has 
claimed that science serves two basic human motives: the capacity to predict and con-
trol and sheer intellectual curiosity (1965, 333). No problem so far. However, he 
equates this intellectual curiosity with the desire to show that everything could be ex-
pected by means of certain laws and initial conditions. In other words, Hempel identi-
fies understanding with expectability. In order to argue that answers to what-if-things-
had-been-different questions are intrinsically valuable, we need a different implemen-
tation of the idea of intellectual curiosity. Hempel assumes that we have an inborn, 
natural desire to try to find out to what extent things that really happened could have 
been predicted. The Woodwardian version would be that we assume that people have 
an inborn and natural desire to try to find out what else could have happened and un-
der which conditions. 
4.  The ideal gas law 
The ideal gas law (IGL) is about standard, isolated quantities of gases in closed spaces. 
It claims a proportional relationship between the pressure P, the volume V and the 
temperature T: 
(IGL)   PV!=!nRT   in which R is the ideal gas constant.   
For an equal quantity n of gas in a container, the product of pressure P and volume V 
is proportional to temperature T. This proportionality constant, R, is the same for all 
ideal gases and is therefore called the ideal gas constant. To explain why this propor-
tionality holds, we need to understand the underlying machinery. To derive (IGL) 
from the Kinetic Theory of Gas (KTG) we will use Kuipers’ account of explanations 
of laws (Kuipers 2001, 82-104).  According to Kuipers, explanations of laws have differ-
ent forms, but contain only steps of five types: application steps, aggregation steps, identi-
fication steps, correlation steps, and approximation steps. As a rule, these steps occur in 
this order, but exceptions are possible. Not all explanations contain steps of all types, and 
some types may occur more than once. 
 (KTG) assumes the following basic hypotheses: 
(a) The ideal gas consists of molecules, and the intermolecular distance in these 
gases is much larger than the dimensions of the molecule itself. Therefore we 
can consider those molecules as point masses. 
(b) The motion of these molecules is governed by Newton’s laws. 
(c) The collisions of the molecules with each other or with the walls of the con-
tainer are in correspondence with Newton’s second and third law, and thus 
considered perfectly elastic. 
The first step is to apply these laws to one molecule with a mass m and a velocity v co-
lliding with the wall of the container. This is the application step of (KTG) to (IGL). 
We consider a cubical box of volume V, with side length L  and a wall surface A (= 
L2). In that box a molecule will collide with one of the walls at a velocity vx,i. We know 
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that collisions between opposite walls in the x-direction on average will happen in in-
tervals of#∆ti = 2 L!!,!.#In that collision the x-component of the momentum will be re-
versed from mvx,i to −mvx,i!.#
 (1) This gives us the following force on the wall:!F = 2mvx,i∆!i #
The second step is an aggregation step. By means of a statistical auxiliary hypothesis 
the individual law is applied to a larger number of molecules. We assume the following 
auxiliary hypothesis: 
(d) The ideal gas is considered a homogeneous distribution of N molecules, 
which are in constant random motion. N is in the order of 6.022×1023, the 
number of Avogadro NA. 
This results in the following aggregated law: 
 (2) F = 2mvx,i∆!iNi=1 .#
By using ∆ti! =  2 !!!,! as an identity hypothesis, we can perform a transformation step 
on (2), which gives us: 
 (3)# F!= mv²x,i
L
N
i=1 = ! 2L mv²x,i2Ni=1 ####
To further proceed, we use the following auxiliary hypothesis:  
(e) the kinetic energy for one particle in one dimension is defined as: T = ! 1
2
mv².  
and apply a second aggregation step: 
(4) Since there are N molecules in the container, moving in three dimen-
sions, this  gives us a total kinetic energy Ttot of :   
  Ttot = ! 12m v²x,i + v²y,i + ! v²z!,iN!!! #=#Tx + Ty + Tz#
We know apply a identification step, since we assumed that the N molecules are mov-
ing in a constant random motion.  
(f) Therefore we can say that  Tx = !Ty = !Tz, and thus we get: 
 (5)# Ttot = !3Tx#
If we implement this in (3) we get: 





Now, another auxiliary hypothesis is added:  
(g) the pressure P is defined as a force F!exerted on a surface A!, here the wall of 
the box:   P = ! F
A
 
Combined with (4), we get another identification step: 
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By means of the statistical auxiliary hypothesis of the virial theorem, the total kinetic 
energy of a system is connected with his temperature T in the following formula: 
(h) Ttot = 32NkT  in which k is the Boltzmann constant.  
We can apply this to (6) and have a third identification step, which gives us: 
 (7) PV = !NkT 
In another auxiliary hypothesis the Boltzmann constant ! is related to the ideal gas 
constant R as: 
(i) k = R
NA
 
As a final result we perform a last identification step on (7) and derive the Ideal Gas 
Law: 
 (8) PV = N
NA
RT = nRT. 
5. Analysis of the IGL explanation 
5.1  
The explanation fits our definition of a micro-explanation: it identifies the compo-
nents (walls of the box, molecules) and describes the activities (linear motion of the 
molecules, collisions). Each of the 6 walls has a specific role in confining the space in 
which the molecules can move (2 boundaries for movement in the X direction, 2 for 
the Y direction and 2 for the Z direction). This is the organisation of the system. The 
explanation also uses other information about the internal structure: the randomly dis-
tributed direction of motion of the molecules. Therefore, it is not a mechanistic ex-
planation but an aggregation explanation. 
5.2  
Like in the mercury example, we can construct here a minimal explanation and an 
elaborate one. The minimal one we consider here is the explanation we obtain by tak-
ing the result of the application step (equation (1)) as a premise (i.e. by removing the 
application step). Let us call the result of that move the “minimal IGL explanation” 
while we call the one presented in Section 4 the “elaborate IGL explanation”.  
 There is an important difference between the IGL case and the thermometer case. 
In the thermometer case, the additional information in the elaborate explanation did 
not deductively imply the premises of the minimal explanation. Although the addi-
tional information results in more explanatory power, it could be removed without 
harming the credibility of the explanation: our reasons for accepting the explanation 
remain intact if we remove it. In the case of the IGL the information that is left out in 
the minimal explanation provides an argument for believing equation (1): this equation 
can be logically derived from it. 
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 This difference creates room for a second advantage that unificatory information 
may have: providing support for premises we may otherwise doubt. Indeed, if we re-
move the application step in the explanation in Section 3, it is unclear why we should 
believe that equation (1) is correct. We certainly cannot do an experiment to support it 
(that would require a setup where we put exactly one gas molecule in a container and 
measure the force it exerts on the wall of the container). Our reasons for accepting 
this premise are theoretical rather than experimental. The elaborate IGL explanation 
incorporates (at least partially) our theoretical reasons for believing equation (1). The 
minimal explanation leaves out these reasons. As a consequence, the elaborate IGL 
explanation is more cogent.  
5.3  
We have now argued that the elaborate explanation is more cogent, but we have not 
shown yet that it is unificatory. Like in the thermometer example, there is—strictly 
speaking—no redescription but rather information that is added to an already existing 
description. Without this additional information, we have no reason to suspect that 
what we see in gases is a manifestation of the same Newtonian principles we see at 
work in movements of macroscopic objects. The extra information in the elaborate 
explanation allows us to see this and at the same time provides a theoretical reason for 
accepting the explanation.   
6. The role of unification in explanations: a wider picture 
6.1 
In Weber, Van Bouwel & Lefevere (2012) we analyse the role of unification in expla-
nations of particular facts. With respect to this role, we distinguish and discuss five 
positions: 
(1) There is no place for unification in the explanatory process of particular facts. 
This view is defended in Halonen & Hintikka (1999). They do not deny the 
value of unification, but they locate this value outside the explanatory process; 
unification is a criterion for theory choice. 
(2) There are cases in which unification is an explanatory virtue, while the aim of 
explanation is not unification. In these cases the aim of explanation is to pro-
vide information about the causes of the explanandum, but it is better or even 
required to do this in a unified way. 
(3) Unification is an explanatory virtue—in the sense specified in (2)—in all cases 
of singular explanation. 
(4) There are cases in which unification is the main aim of singular explanation 
(as opposed to merely an explanatory virtue). 
(5) Unification is always the main aim of singular explanation (this is the position 
of Kitcher 1981 and 1989). 
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In the paper mentioned above we argue that (2) is correct. A corollary of this is that 
(1) is refuted. Starting from (2), there are two ways to ascribe a stronger role to unifi-
cation. We argue that the first way, generalizing from some to all, does not work. In 
other words, we argue against position (3). The other way, shifting from unification as 
an explanatory virtue to unification as the main aim of explanation, is also discussed in 
the paper. We argue that position (4) is correct, while (5) is wrong. 
 We have mentioned this paper for two reasons. First, we want to draw attention to 
similar but different work we have done on explanation of particular facts rather than 
explanation of laws. Second, the overview of possible positions above introduces two 
contrasts that are important for situating what we have done in the philosophical liter-
ature on unification and in the mechanistic tradition in the philosophy of explanation. 
The contrasts are: (a) all vs. some; and (b) unification as an explanatory virtue vs. uni-
fication as the aim of explanation. We use these contrasts in 6.2 to situate our posi-
tion. 
6.2  
With respect to explanations of laws, a hard core unificationist will defend the follow-
ing position: 
(SU) When explaining a law, our aim must always be to subsume the law under 
more general laws and—in this way—to unify our knowledge. 
A hard core mechanist holds the following, incompatible position: 
(SM) When explaining a law, our aim must always be to provide a model of the 
mechanism which is responsible for the behaviour at the macro-level. 
We think that both positions are wrong. Adopting (SU) implies that one denies the 
value of mechanistic explanation. Adopting (SM) requires that we deny that the IGL 
explanation as presented in Section 4 is adequate or adopt a very liberal notion of or-
ganisation (cf. McKay Illari & Williamson 2012). Furthermore, (SM) denies the value 
of certain inferential explanations of laws (see Gervais & Weber 2013b for this). We 
adopt the following views: 
(WU)  When explaining a law, our aim must sometimes be to subsume the law under 
more general laws and—in this way—to unify our knowledge. 
(WM) When explaining a law, our aim must sometimes be to provide a model of the 
mechanism which is responsible for the behaviour at the macro-level. 
However, the value of what we have done does not depend strongly on these views. 
What we have done is also important for an adherent of (SM). The reason for this is 
that we talk about unification as an explanatory virtue, not about unification as an aim 
of explanation. This will be further discussed in Section 6.3. 
 Remarkably, what we have done in this paper makes no sense at all for a hard core 
unificationist who adheres to (SU). From that perspective, we have already made a 
mistake by positing that scientists try to develop micro-explanations of laws. So from 
that point of view, our paper rests on a false assumption. 
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6.3  
The paper of Levy & Bechtel we used in Section 1.2 is about abstraction as an explan-
atory virtue. The authors argue that—in some contexts—abstract, skeletal models are 
better explanations than rich models that include a lot of details about the mechanism. 
A similar point is made in Gervais & Weber (2013a). The underlying idea of these pa-
pers is that mechanistic philosophers (i.e. philosophers who subscribe to (WM) or 
(SM)) have to think about what makes some mechanistic explanations better than oth-
er ones. In other words: they have to think about the explanatory virtues and vices of 
mechanistic explanations. One axis along which one can compare mechanistic expla-
nations (and other micro-explanations) is richness/abstraction. This axis is explored in 
the two papers mentioned above. In this paper we have explored a second axis: more 
or less unification.  
7. Conclusion 
We have argued that, in the context of micro-explanations of laws, providing unifica-
tory information may have two advantages: it can result in higher explanatory power 
and it can result in more cogent explanations. We do not claim that these advantages 
are exhaustive: there may be other virtues attached to unification in this context. 
However, we think we have discovered and described two important ones (i.e., ad-
vantages that occur frequently in scientific practice). 
 In this paper we have approached unification from an epistemologi-
cal/methodological angle. Due to space constraints, we did not investigate the possi-
ble metaphysical implications of our views.4 These issues will be addressed in future 
work. 
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